The two-party Diffie-Hellman (DH) key-exchanging technique is extended to generate (i) multiple twoparty keys and (ii) one multi-party key. The participants in the former case exchange two public keys and generate 15 shared keys. Of these, 4 keys are called base keys, because they are used to generate the other 11 keys called extended keys. The main advantages are the reduction of the key exchange overhead, increase of additional protection to the keys and widening of applicability. In the latter case, an efficient contributory multi-party key-exchanging technique for a large static group is proposed. In this technique, a member who acts as a group controller forms two-party groups with other group members and generates a DH-style shared key per group. It then combines these keys into a single multi-party key and acts as a normal group member. The proposed technique has been compared with other multi-party key-generating techniques, and satisfactory results have been obtained.
Introduction
Because of the rapid increase of popularity of remote communication through unsecured channels such as the Internet, the use of cryptographic protocols to secure them increases. Even though there are many efficient cryptosystems currently available, their reliability depends on the keys being used, because the messages are easily interpreted when opponents know the secret values. Although this problem is overcome by changing the cryptographic keys frequently, the question is how it can be done through public communication channels. In fact, the ability to dynamically and publicly establish a session key for secured communication is a big challenge in cryptography. Although public key algorithms prior to communication may be used for establishing the session keys [1-3], it requires additional key exchange operations (KEOs) per session and increases overhead. In such conditions, if multiple shared keys are exchanged securely at a time with comparatively fewer KEOs and if a key or even multiple keys are used in the same session, it not only eases the establishment of session keys, but also reduces the key exchange overhead significantly. The same is implemented in the first part of the present work, where the generation of multiple two-party shared keys is proposed. The method is mainly an extension of the Diffie -Hellman (DH) public key-exchanging technique [2] , where instead of one, it requires the exchange of two pairs of public keys. It is seen that the proposed technique generates 15 DH-style keys with 12 exponent operations and 22 multiplications. On the other hand, the original DH technique can generate a single shared key through the exchange of one pair of public keys and the execution of four exponentiation operations (no multiplication is required).
The paper also proposes an extension of the basic DH to generate a multi-party key for a large static group. Its main advantage is to implement various groupware applications such as conference calls, distributed computation, distributed databases and so on in a secured way. Since the key distribution is the main factor of the secure group communication, it has received a lot of attention recently, and a number of efficient techniques have been proposed [4 -8] . Now some research works on DH and its extensions are considered.
Although the DH was proposed for a cyclic group of order n, it also works in commutative rings [9] and Galois field GF(2 p ) [10] . A variant of DH, where the modulus is a composite number, is also studied in [10] . On the basis of DH, ElGamal has developed an encryption and digital signature algorithm [11] . Hughes [12] made a different variation of DH, where he shows that the shared key can be computed before any interaction, that is, one party prior to contacting others can encrypt a message using a secret key and send it to different people, and interact individually later to exchange the key. Another use of DH is to develop a common database containing the public keys of the users [3] . In this method, anyone who wants to communicate with other person in the database needs to retrieve the public key of the person from database and generates his or her shared secret key. But for secrecy, the public key database should be certified.
The two-party DH key exchange algorithm has been extended to work with three or more parties and several techniques have been proposed. Basically, all the group keygenerating techniques can be divided into two classes. In one class, a single participant generates the key and distributes it to all parties [13, 14] . It is efficient if it is implemented correctly. However, it requires a trusted key generator, and it is assumed that the generated key is valid and secured. A group key in the other class is a contributory key, which is generated by the exchange of the private values of the individual group members and by some additional KEOs [6, 8, 13, [15] [16] [17] . The group key-generating technique proposed in this paper belongs to this class. Some group key-generating techniques are addressed now.
In the case of a three-member group, each member individually assumes a random number and exchanges the private values to each other to generate the secret key K ¼ g xyz mod n, where x, y and z are the random private keys assumed by three parties [3] . It can be extended similarly to four or more parties. On the basis of DH, three group key algorithms with increased performance are reported in [16] , where it is shown that the two of them are proved to be optimal with respect to the certain measure of computation and communication complexities. In brief, the basic idea of these methods is to follow two stages known as up-and down-flow stages. In the up-flow stage, a participant i (1 i n for n-party group) collects intermediate values from the participant i 2 1 and computes g n 1 n 2 ...,n i by raising g n 1 n 2 ...,n iÀ1 to the power of n i , where n 1 , n 1 , . . . , n i are the private keys of the i participants. The up-flow ends when the highest numbered group member receives up-flow messages and computes the intended group key. On the other hand, the highest numbered group member initiates the down-flow stage after generating the group key. Several efficient methods for generating group keys are also reported in [6 -8, 15] , where each group member is treated as a group in the first round. Each group member then creates a new group with its sibling and executes a two-party key exchange protocol to generate a new group key. In the next and subsequent rounds, the group controllers of every group transmit public values to their sibling groups and compute the new group key using two-party key exchange. The process is repeated until there is only one group. One of the advantages is that it needs only log 2 n iterations to complete the generation of the group key for an n-party group.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. The basics of the original two-party DH algorithm are given in Section 2, and Section 3 describes the details of the proposed extension to generate multiple two-party keys. The security of the generated keys and the selection of the shared keys are also given in this section. Section 4 addresses the generation of multi-party key, where its security and comparative analysis are given. Finally, Section 5 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries of two-party DH technique
Diffie and Hellman introduced the concept of a two-party key-exchanging technique [2] that allows two participants to exchange two public keys through unsecured channel and generate a shared secured key between them. Each party then combines the other's public key along with its own private key to generate a shared key. For clarity, a brief discussion of the DH technique follows.
Let A and B be the two participants that do not know anything about each other, but wish to establish a secured shared key between them. It consists of five steps as mentioned below.
Step 1: Both A and B agree on two large positive integers, n and g such that n is a prime number (and the order of a finite cyclic group) and g is a group generator.
Step 2: Party A randomly chooses a positive integer, x, which is smaller than n and serves as A's private key. Similarly, B chooses its own private key, y.
Step 3: Both A and B compute their public keys using X ¼ g x mod n and Y ¼ g y mod n, respectively.
Step 4: They exchange their public keys through a public communication channel.
Step 5: On receiving, both A and B compute their shared key
For practical application, it is assumed that DH holds decisional DH (DDH) assumption [18, 19] , which means that no polynomial time algorithm exists to compute K upon knowing X, Y, g and n. Now the generation of multiple two-party shared keys is addressed. 
Generation of multiple two-party keys
In brief, each party in the proposed technique assumes two random values and generates two public keys. These keys are then exchanged between the participants and multiple shared keys are generated. The details of the key-exchanging technique are given below.
Proposed key-exchanging technique
The participant A generates two public keys as given below and sends to B
where X i and x i , for i ¼ 1, 2, are the public and private keys of A, respectively. Similarly, the participant B chooses two private keys y 1 and y 2 randomly and generates two public keys as
where Y 1 and Y 2 are public keys.
These keys are transmitted to A. Now on exchange of two pairs of public keys, the participants can generate more than one shared key. Because instead of a single combination of the private keys (xy) as exist in basic DH, four combinations such as x 1 y 1 , x 1 y 2 , x 2 y 1 , x 2 y 2 exist, and each of them can generate a DH-style key. The generation of four shared keys is given below.
The party A can compute the following keys
Similarly, the party B can compute the following keys
, thus four shared keys are generated. These four keys are termed as the base keys, because 11 additional shared keys can be derived by multiplying the base keys in different combinations. These keys are called extended keys as derived below.
If any two base keys, say k 1 and k 2 for instance, are multiplied, then we have
Although the key k 5 can be generated by the participants simply by multiplication, it is not true for the opponents.
Because it appears to the opponents as a DDH problem such as
The key k 5 is a shared key as each party individually can generate it. Also the private values x i and y i for i ¼ 1, 2 are hidden; it is not possible for the opponents to determine k 5 by knowing Y 1 , Y 2 , X 1, g and n.
Therefore this key appears to be secured (security analysis is given later).
Similarly, any two base keys can be considered for multiplication and note that out of four base keys there exists six ( 4 C 2 ) such multiplications, and therefore six shared keys are generated. The generation of the five shared keys is given below, where their expressions in terms of the public keys are given in the square brackets
Now instead of two, if three base keys at a time are considered for multiplication, then we can have four such multiplications ( 4 C 3 ), and therefore another four shared keys are generated. The generation of these keys is given below Finally, if all four base keys are multiplied together, a single shared key ( 4 C 4 ) is generated. The generation of the key is done using (1) Single round (15) (2) Interchange of four messages (30)
(3) Execution of twelve exponentiation operations (60) (4) Execution of twenty-two multiplications (nil)
The technique is a generalisation of the basic DH and it can be extended further. For instance, if each participant instead of 2 assumes 3 private keys and exchanges public keys, then 9 base keys and 502 extended keys can be generated. One advantage of the method is that it requires fewer KEOs with the increase of the number of shared keys generated. However, all the keys are equally secured as considered now.
Security of the proposed technique
We consider DDH assumption for the security of the shared keys generated using the Group-DH technique. For this we assume large finite cyclic groups that hold DDH assumption [5] , and it is widely believed that there exist such groups for which DDH is intractable. For instance, let p, q and g be publicly known, where p and q are large primes and p ¼ jGj¼ 2q þ 1, and g is the generator of a subgroup QR p of Z Ã p and q ¼ jQR p j. If the participants choose their private keys from Z q ¼ f0, 1, 2, . . . , q 2 1g, then an adversary cannot distinguish between the random keys in QR p and the keys that are generated by DH technique. Consider the formal definition of DDH as given below: Assumption 1 [5] : Using the DDH assumption, let K 1 and K 2 be random numbers, and PK i for i ¼ 1, 2 be the corresponding public values. The shared value K ¼ PK 1 op K 2 ¼ PK 2 op K 1 using two-party secure group key exchange is indistinguishable in polynomial time from a random value, where op is an exponentiation operation.
From the security point of view, Assumption 1 is very strong and many secured practical cryptographic systems are designed based on it. The present paper also follows this assumption to generate secured multiple two-party shared keys. Consider the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Four two-party shared keys k 1 , k 2 , k 3 and k 4 (base keys) derived in the application of the basic DH technique are indistinguishable in polynomial time from random numbers.
Proof: For a cyclic group that holds DDH assumption, it is believed that the shared key generated using basic DH is indistinguishable in polynomial time from random numbers. Note that each of the four shared keys k i for i ¼ 1, 2, 3, 4 is basically a DH style key because they are derived in the application of the DH technique four times, and therefore they must be indistinguishable in polynomial time from random numbers. That is, it is not possible in polynomial time to derive the shared key using k i ¼ g x j y j mod n, where j ¼ 1, 2 and x i and y i are private keys. Hence, the theorem follows.
A Corollary 1: The extended 11 shared keys generated by multiplying the 4 base keys in different combinations are also indistinguishable in polynomial time from random numbers.
Proof: In fact the extended keys, although they are generated by multiplying the base keys in different order, appear to the opponents as a DDH problem. Therefore no polynomial time algorithm exists to distinguish them from random numbers. A
In addition to reducing KEOs, the proposed technique provides additional safety over basic DH. The reason is that it not only requires solving the DDH problems, but also requires selecting particular combination to identify the specific DDH, or solving all DDHs and applying resulting keys iteratively to decrypt the encrypted messages. However, for a communication, the participants must agree upon a particular key. One method for the selection of a shared key is shown, but other efficient methods can be developed easily. www.ietdl.org
Selection of shared key
As shown, the proposed extension can generate multiple shared keys, and it is therefore necessary to select a key for a session. We may follow a method similar to a method known as Merkle's puzzle [20] as described below.
A party generates 220 messages each with having a different puzzle number and a secret key number and sends all messages to the other party in encrypted form. Note that a different 20 bit key is used for encryption of each message. The other party chooses one message at random and performs brute-force attack to decrypt it (although it needs a large amount of work, it is computable). It then encrypts its message with the key thus recovered and sends it to the first party along with the puzzle number. Since it knows the puzzle number, it thus identifies the key and decrypts the message. Similarly, in order to select a key out of 15 shared keys, one party generates a message comprising a shared key and a puzzle number. After encrypting it either with the smallest or largest key of the shared keys generated, it is sent to the other party. The message is easily decrypted as the recipient knows all keys and the (shared key, puzzle number) pair is recovered. The party then either sends the puzzle number alone or an encrypted message along with the puzzle number to the first party, where the message is encrypted with the shared key found. Since the first party knows the puzzle number, it therefore identifies the session key and can decrypt the message. For subsequent changes, the present session key may be used to encrypt a shared key at one end, and it is decrypted at the other end to obtain the new session key.
Generation of multi-party key
Although the original DH generates a shared key in a twoparty group, different researchers have extended it to the multi-party situations. In this section, we propose a useful DH-based multi-party key-generating technique for large static groups, called Group-DH. We consider that it holds DDH assumption for the security of the group key.
Proposed Group-DH technique
We propose a contributory group key agreement protocol to exchange a multi-party key among the group members. In Group-DH, an arbitrary group member acts as a group controller that actually establishes the group-key and after which it becomes a normal member of the group. Let the group controller be P i , where 1 i n for n-party group. Initially it itself forms a two-party group with each of the remaining group members, and produces (n 2 1) two-party groups. The P i then generates a DH style key per group, and produces (n 2 1) shared keys for (n 2 1) two-party groups. In order to accomplish it, P i generates a public key and broadcasts to the remaining group members.
The public key X i can be generated using
where x i is the private key of the P i .
Each group member, P j , where j = i also assumes a private key and generates a public key as
where x j is the private key of P j and 1 j n, j = i.
Each P j then transmits X j to the group controller, P i . After exchanging the public keys, each member similar to the basic DH generates a unique shared key, K j , with group controller as
Similarly, P i generates the same shared key, using
It actually generates (n 2 1) shared keys for (n 2 1) groups. The group controller combines these shared keys to produce a single group key. The P i computes the public key X k as given below and sends to P j .
where 1 k n, k = j.
Each party in the group then generates the group key K as follows 
Since the group controller knows all the two-party shared keys, it also generates the group key using
The proposed Group-DH mainly consists of two steps as summarised below.
Group-DH technique
Step 1: A member acts as a group controller and forms a two-party group with the remaining group members. Each group individually generates a DH-style key using DH technique.
Step 2: The group controller generates (n 2 1) public keys by raising the exponent of g with the product of (n 2 2) shared keys at a time and sends to the corresponding group members. On receiving, each member raises the exponent with its own shared key and generates the group key.
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Security of the Group-DH technique
We consider that the DH technique is secured as it supports strong DDH assumption. We can claim that the Group-DH that extends DH to multi-party system must be secured. Consider the following theorem.
Theorem 2: The group key derived in the application of Group-DH is indistinguishable in polynomial time from random numbers.
Proof: Each of the two-party shared key generated in Step 1 of Group-DH is secured, because it uses DH protocol that supports DDH assumption. That is, all the two-party shared keys exchanged in Step 1 are indistinguishable from random numbers in polynomial time. Also the generation of the public keys made in Step 2 follows equivalent procedure as used in the basic DH protocol, because instead of raising the power of g by a single secret value, a product of multiple values is used. Note that this product is also secured as it is obtained by multiplying the secured shared keys generated in Step 1. In the final round, each group member again follows the same DH technique to raise the power of the public key by its own shared key. Since the Group-DH imitates the basic DH and supports DDH assumption, the group key generated by Group-DH is indistinguishable from random numbers in polynomial time, and thus secured. A
Comparisons
In this section, the proposed Group-DH technique has been compared with other efficient group key-exchanging techniques [6 -8, 15, 16] . Since Group-DH is proposed for large static group, the comparison is made for the initialisation operation only. Therefore the numbers of rounds, messages, sequential exponentiation operations and so on are considered in the comparison. The results are shown in the Table 1 , where h ¼ dlog 2 ne. It is seen that the proposed method is better than techniques like STR [7] and GDR3.0 [16] . Although the number of rounds and sequential exponentiation operations (except communication cost) of the Group-DH is higher than the techniques like CCEGK [21] , EGK [15] , TGDH [6] , one advantage of the method is its simplicity because it uses only two steps comprising very simple operations to generate the group key. Since the group controller needs to execute comparatively more KEOs than the other group members, the overall delay of key generation depends on the performance of it. Since most of today's machines have high computation power, the proposed technique may not be a problem for practical applications.
Conclusions
Two extensions of the basic DH technique are proposed and they are exchange of multiple two-party shared keys and one multi-party key. The extension proposed in the first case can generate multiple DH-style keys with comparatively less key generation overhead (KEOs). It also provides more protection to the keys and increases applicability. On the other hand, the extension proposed in the second case can generate a multi-party key for large static groups. Although the technique is proposed for a static group, it may be easily extended for large dynamic groups. It uses simpler steps and needs comparatively less communication and computation costs, and therefore may be useful for practical applications. [7] n 2 1 2 n 2 2 0 2 n 2 2 2 n 2 2 2 ( n 2 1) GDH3.0 [16] n þ 1 2 n 2 1 2 n 2 3 2 3 n 2 6 5 n 2 6
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